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Abstract 
 
 
A fundamental issue for economists is what determines civil conflict. 
One unsettled question is the relative importance of political freedoms 
versus economic development. This paper takes a new approach to 
provide an answer by using micro-data based on surveys of revolutionary 
preferences of 130,000 people living in 61 nations between 1980 and 
1997. Controlling for personal characteristics, country and year fixed 
effects, more freedom and economic growth both reduce revolutionary 
support. Losing one level of freedom, equivalent to a shift from the US to 
Turkey, increases support for revolt by 4 percentage points. To reduce 
support by the same amount requires adding 14 percentage points onto 
the GDP growth rate. Being Muslim in a free country has no effect on the 
probability of supporting revolt compared to a non-religious person. 
However being Muslim in a country that is not free increases it by 13 
percentage points. Being Christian in a free country decreases the chance 
of supporting revolt by 4 percentage points, compared to a non-religious 
person, and in a not-free country by 1 percentage point. 
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I. Introduction 
 
One of the suspected causes of civil conflict has been the denial of democratic freedoms 
to a nation’s people. Whether or not to support regimes whose legitimacy is questioned 
for this reason has posed a foreign policy dilemma for the United States. In the case of 
Saudi Arabia, rather than push for political reform, one view argues that successive 
administrations have “indulged Riyadh's penchant for buying off trouble as long as the regime also 
paid its huge arms bills, purchased Boeing aircraft, kept the price of oil within reasonable bounds, and 
allowed the United States to use Saudi air bases”.1 However the absence of freedom in Saudi 
Arabia has not been without its costs. These are difficult to directly quantify. Some trace 
the origins of the September 11th World Trade Center attack to a perceived lack of 
legitimacy of the Saudi regime amongst groups of its people. Subsequent to this act of 
terrorism a new focus for US aid policy was announced, which stressed that “we must tie 
greater aid to political and legal and economic reforms. Our new approach for development … must 
build the institutions of freedom”.2 There are several old and fundamental empirical questions 
that arise here. First, does lack of freedom result in greater support for rebellion? And if 
so, what is the cost of buying off the potential threat of greater instability? More 
formally, can we calculate a marginal rate of substitution between economic 
development and political freedoms, keeping the support for revolt unchanged? And is 
there evidence of a difference between Christians and Muslims? This paper is an attempt 
to answer these questions. 
To do so, we take a different approach to previous studies by using a large 
international survey of the revolutionary tastes of over one hundred thousand people. 
We find that, controlling for the characteristics of people and countries, both the level of 
political and civil freedoms as well as the pace of economic development have marked 
and statistically robust effects on the taste for revolt. A loss of freedom has costs that 
appear to be large in economic terms. Dropping down one level of freedom (on a 1-3 
                                                 
1 See Martin Indyk, Ex-US Ambassador to Israel, in Foreign Affairs (2002). 
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scale) requires higher growth rates of 14 percentage points per year to keep the support 
for revolt unchanged. The effects are significantly stronger for Muslims. A policy of 
“buying off trouble” by going for growth when freedoms are denied appears to require 
close to unattainable rates of sustained economic growth. 
This paper takes a different approach to previous empirical studies. Rather than 
focusing on the effect of freedoms and level of development on observable 
revolutionary actions at the aggregate level, our focus is on the micro-economic 
structure of revolutionary tastes. The source of this information is survey data that ask 
people whether they believe that “the entire way our society is organised must be radically changed 
by revolutionary action”. This approach puts the present paper in the spirit of a growing 
literature in economics that has used survey data to test for the determinants of 
individual preference parameters. The World Values Data Set we use to measure 
revolutionary tastes was also used to obtain indicators of trust and civic norms in Knack 
and Keefer’s (1997) study of the determinants of “social capital”. Survey data were first 
significantly used in economics to help value public goods. Respondents were asked 
questions about their “willingness to pay” to, for example, save an endangered species.3 
Luttmer (2001) used a U.S. General Social Survey question to help shed light on the 
determinants of the support for welfare spending.4 Respondents indicated whether they 
believed welfare spending to be “too high”, “about right” or “too low”. Luttmer identifies 
diminishing support for welfare spending as the share of local recipients from their own 
racial group falls. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) studied preferences for redistribution, as 
proxied by a question asking whether “the government ought to reduce the income differences 
between rich and poor”. Survey questions that ask respondents to judge the extent to which 
“improper practices (such as bribing and corruption) prevail in the public sphere” have been used to 
study the determinants of corruption in the economy.5 Another strand of literature in 
economics has studied the determinants of human well-being, as proxied by a survey 
                                                                                                                                                                  
2 President George Bush, United Nations, Mexico, March 22, 2002. 
3 See Cummings, Brookshire and Schulze (1986) for a literature review. 
4 Boeri, Borsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001) studied support for welfare spending in Europe using survey data. 
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question that asks a respondent “How happy are you?”.6 A more closely related paper to 
the present one using survey data is Frey and Schneider (1978). It studies the 
determinants of the popularity of the U.S. President. However, rather than measuring 
approval ratings of one member or one party of government, our focus is on extreme 
dissatisfaction with the entire organization of a country. 
Previous empirical studies have produced a diverse array of ambiguous findings 
on the relationship between freedom and the extent of civil conflict.7 A recent literature 
review lists “a number of possible causes of civil war [that] are still being debated”. The first is “the 
role of political grievance and lack of democracy” (Sambanis (2001)). One strand of work, largely 
by economists, has argued that there is no significant relation between lack of democracy 
and the likelihood of there being an actual civil war.8 On the other side of the debate are 
several political scientists going back to Gurr (1970) who have argued that political 
grievance is the primary motive for civil violence.9 Even the role of economic 
development on conflict has proved controversial, with one review going so far as to 
state “that [empirical studies] show no consistent relation of level of economic development to political 
violence” (Coleman (1990)).10 The more recent assessment by Sambanis (2001) is more 
optimistic. He highlights several papers that argue that there is an empirically robust 
relationship between poverty, slow growth and an increased likelihood of civil war 
onset.11 However there is “disagreement [surrounding] the very definition of a civil war”, the 
dependent variable used in all these quantitative studies.12 They have typically used an 
                                                                                                                                                                  
5 See, for example, Di Tella and Ades (1999) on how industrial policy affects malfeasance. 
6 Richard Easterlin (1974) began what remains a small literature. Clark and Oswald (1994) found that being unemployed had 
a large adverse impact on a person’s self-reported well-being. Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001) found negative 
effects on happiness of the inflation rate and the unemployment rate. 
7 The literature on conflict largely begins with Karl Marx’s (1887) Das Kapital. See also Haavelmo (1954), Tullock (1974) and 
Schumpeter (1991). 
8 Examples are Collier and Hoeffler (2000) and Fearon and Laitin (2001). 
9 Eldbadawi and Sambanis (2002), Esty et al (1998) and Reynal-Querol (2002) support this conclusion. Hegre et al (2001) 
find evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between the level of democracy and the risk of civil war onset. See also, 
inter alia, Tilly (1978), Tarrow (1989), Francisco (1993) and Gurr and Moore (1997). 
10 Huber, Rueschmeyer and Stephens (1993) study the relationship between level of development and democracy. 
11 These include Collier and Hoeffler (2000) and Fearon and Laitin (2001). See also Alesina and Perotti (1996) who study the 
effect of inequality on political stability in order to estimate the effect of inequality on growth and Alesina, Özler, Roubini 
and Swagel (1996). MacCulloch (2000a,b) finds negative effects of GDP per capita and positive effects of income inequality 
on tastes for revolt using the Euro-Barometer Survey Series. 
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12 See Sambanis (2001) for a discussion of the idiosyncratic definitions of civil war. 
absolute number of battle deaths as a threshold (say 1,000) that is not scaled by 
population size. Annual data on deaths can be difficult to obtain in many cases, making 
it “difficult to study conflict escalation and impossible to study conflict intensity”.9 These problems 
imply that only limited time variation in the dependent variable has been able to be 
exploited.13 There are other reasons why actual conflict may have proven difficult to 
explain and predict. Revolutionary tastes arising from objective economic conditions 
may not translate into actions due to the free-rider problem that undermines collective 
action.14 This problem may be especially acute when an oppressive regime deliberately 
targets dissident groups. Such factors make it difficult to identify the causes of revolts 
whenever cross-country/regional data are used in studies whose dependent variable is 
the actual occurrence (or not) of violent uprisings.15 
In Section II some simple theory is outlined to help motivate the empirical 
strategy. It is designed to emphasize the distinction between tastes for revolt and the 
(collective) action required to achieve one. Section III outlines the empirical strategy and 
introduces the World Values Survey that records the revolutionary tastes of 
approximately 130,000 people living in 61 countries between 1981 and 1997. These 
micro-data enable us to differentiate between the effects of both aggregate level variables 
such as freedom and GDP, as well as personal characteristics. Its panel dimension, taken 
over three time periods, means that we can control for unobserved heterogeneity using 
fixed effects. Section III reports several different validation exercises in which we 
correlate each respondent’s taste for revolt with five different types of confrontational 
political action that the person may or may not have taken to achieve change (such as 
                                                 
13 There has also been a recent resurgence of interest in choice-theoretic models on conflict in economics. Part of the 
literature focuses on the choice between investing in productive or appropriative activities by different parties who are 
attempting to win control of a prize. Grossman (1991) explicitly models this choice in the context of a large group of people 
who are revolting against a regime. See also Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001), Collier and Hoeffler (2000), Fearon and 
Laitin (2001), Garfinkel and Skaperdas (1996), Grossman (1994, 1999), Hirshleifer (1995), Skaperdas (1991, 1992), Roemer 
(1998), inter alia. Another strand of the literature focuses on the choice confronting an individual of whether to personally 
exert effort as part of a wider campaign of collective action. Recent examples include Kuran (1991) and Lohmann (1994) 
who show how protest activity can trigger a cascade of more protests that lead to the incumbent regime’s collapse. 
14 See Mancur Olson (1965), The Logic of Collective Action. As a result, a number of theorists have turned to the role of 
charisma of revolutionary leaders and ideology to help explain observed collective action. 
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15 The unpredictability and suddenness of actual revolts has been emphasized by Kuran (1991). 
occupation of buildings or factories). At the aggregate level, we correlate support for 
revolt with the occurrence or not of actual civil war in the corresponding country. 
Section IV describes the main results on what happens to tastes for revolt when either a 
country’s level of freedom or its GDP changes. Section V reports results that exploit 
information contained in the Muslim and Christian sub-samples of the data set. Section 
VI provides some further checks on the results and Section VII concludes. 
 
II. Some Theory 
 
Let yi be an individual’s income and F represent an index of political and civic freedoms. 
Let Ui (ci) be the utility function of individual i, where Uc
′>0 and Uc’’<0 for all i. Let E(.) 
be the expectation operator. Assume that individuals face a standard utility maximization 
problem but that in addition to their budget constraint they also face a constraint on 
their attainable levels of consumption due to state laws (for example, outlawing alcohol 
or restrictions on the type of clothing). The problem each individual solves is: 
 
)cU ii (     maximize          (1) 
ConstraintBudget                      that      such ii Yc.p ≤       
Constraint Freedom      (                      and )Fcc maxi ≤       
 
where c i is a vector of consumption goods and p is a vector of prices. The vector, cmax(F), 
specifies the maximum consumption levels allowed for each good due to potential 
restriction of freedoms by the government. From problem (1) we can define each 
individual’s indirect utility function, U(Yi, F, p).  
Let an individual have a rational preference for revolt if he or she would experience an 
expected utility gain from one: 
 
0c(Uc(U voltReNoii
voltRe
iii     )     )}E{                 >−=∆     (2) 
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where YRevolt, FRevolt and pRevolt are the levels of income, freedom and prices in the event of a 
revolt and Y0, F0 and p0 are their initial levels in the absence of one. Equation (3) 
compares the expected utility derived from income and freedom obtained in the event of 
a revolt with the utility derived from existing income and freedom levels in the “no 
revolt” status quo. If ∆i>0 then the individual has a preference for revolt. A person’s 
post-revolt income, YRevolt, may be expected to change depending on their pre-revolt 
income (i.e. whether the person is relatively rich or poor) as well as on the moments of 
the income distribution. Freedoms in the event of a revolt, FRevolt, may or may not change 
depending on the policies of the new government. 
 
A Simple Case 
Let individuals have the separable indirect utility function, Ui(yi, Fi) = αi log yi + βi log F 
where αi>0 and βi>0 are individual-specific parameters reflecting personal 
characteristics (such as religion or employment status). This functional form implicitly 
assumes that both the budget and freedom constraints in problem (1) are binding. 
Let 0 Y be the initial mean level of income and ri0= yi0/
0
Y be each individual’s initial 
relative income position. In the event that a revolt occurs assume either that wealth is 
equally shared with no output loss (i.e. yiRevolt=
volt
Y
Re = 0Y >1 for ∀i), or that some output 
is lost leaving all incomes equal to unity. Let both outcomes occur with equal 
probability. Assume that everyone shares the same level of freedom in the absence of a 
revolt, F0, and also in the event of one, FRevolt. Hence a rational individual has a 
preference for revolt if his or her expected utility gain is positive: 
 
0
F
FyY o
voltRe
iiii     )(log   )log  -log(1) 0.5  log  (0.5    
00 >++= βα∆  
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Comparative static conditions derived from equation (4) are:  
1. ∂∆i/∂F0  < 0 
2. ∂∆i/∂ri0  < 0 
3. ∂∆i/∂ 0 Y < 0. 
 
These conditions state that for the present case revolutionary preferences depend 
negatively on the initial level of freedom, negatively on an each individual’s relative 
income position and negatively on the average level of incomes. Since a higher initial 
level of freedom implies a higher level of utility relative to what one expects to receive in 
the event of revolt, the effect is to decrease the utility gain from revolt. ∆i also decreases 
with relative income, ri, due to the assumption that everyone ends up with the same level 
of income in the event of a revolt occurring (so that the higher one’s initial income is, 
the less one gains). The reason for the negative effect of mean income is that when 
people become absolutely better off, even relatively poor ones have more to lose if the 
revolt does not succeed. The size of each of these effects depends on the individual 
parameters, αi and βi. 
We shall use data on revealed preferences for revolt as the (discrete) observation 
of the underlying continuous variable, ∆i. The objective of this paper is to test for the 
effects on one’s taste for revolt of country freedoms, average income levels, each 
individual’s relative income position and other personal characteristics. This will also 
allow us to “price freedom” in the sense of obtaining marginal rates of substitution 
between freedom and income, keeping revolutionary support constant. 
 
Preferences versus Actions 
Having a rational preference for revolt should be distinguished from actual participation 
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in one. An individual may only be willing to exert effort to achieve radical social change, 
for example, to the extent that the free-rider problem is overcome. To illustrate, assume 
that it costs an individual c(ei , F) to exert effort ei on revolt (e.g. due to less work time 
and a corresponding lower wage income) where c'e>0 and c'F≤0. The latter condition may 
arise from a higher cost of acting against a more repressive government. Let average 
revolutionary efforts across the whole population be equal to ē and the probability of a 
revolt actually occurring equal p, where p is a function of ei and ē. Each individual 
chooses his or her level of effort to maximize expected utility, EW i = Ui (yi0, F0) + p(ei, 
ē).∆i - c(ei, F0). Complementary slackness conditions are: 
 
0Fe(c).e,e(p 0ieiie ii     ) , - ≤′′ ∆        and       e 0i    ≥ .     (5) 
 
If the probability of a revolt occurring is independent of any individual’s efforts then 
pei'(ei, ē)=0 and so ei=0. In such a case, each person hopes to free-ride on the efforts of 
others but in equilibrium there is zero average effort and no actual revolt, despite the 
existence of people who may have a preference for this event (i.e. ∆i>0). Only when 
pei'(ei, ē) >0 can there exist an interior solution. 
Note that although a reduction in freedoms may increase the expected utility gain 
from a revolt for an individual (i.e. ∆i increases) he or she may be less willing to exert 
effort to achieve one due to its higher cost (since c (eie i ,F0) may also increase). Since we 
have micro-data on whether each individual has actually participated in collective action, 
such as mass protests and demonstrations, we are also able to study the connection 
between having a taste for revolution and the actions taken (or not) to achieve radical 
change. 
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III. Data Description and Validity 
 
III. 1. Data Description 
Revolutionary Preferences 
The source of the data on the taste for revolt is the three waves of the World Values 
Survey Series (1981-84, 1990-92, 1995-97) that has interviewed a random sample of 
168,482 individuals in 64 independent countries16. Of these, 130,278 people in 61 
nations have answered the following question: “On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes 
vis-à-vis the society in which we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion (one 
answer only)”. The three relevant response categories are: “The entire way our society is 
organised must be radically changed by revolutionary action”, “Our society must be gradually improved 
by reforms”, and “Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces” (The 
“Don't know” and “Not asked in this survey” categories are not included in our data set). 
Appendix 1 provides a summary of the World Values Survey Series. 
Table 1.1 shows the proportions of individuals who desire revolutionary action, 
versus those who do not (i.e. the ones who desire either gradual reforms or the present 
society valiantly defended) for the entire sample, the unemployed, male and female, 
religious persons and income quartile. Of the full sample, 9.8% of respondents declare a 
taste for revolution in their country. Of the unemployed, 14.1% prefer revolt. Of those 
people who belong to a religious denomination, 9.2% show a taste for revolution 
whereas for those who do not belong to a religion, 10.3% want revolt. The breakdown 
between religions shows sizeable differences. Whereas 7.9% of Christians want revolt, 
17.4% of Muslims do. There also exists a monotonically declining proportion of people 
who want revolt as we go up the income quintiles. In the first (or bottom) quintile, 
second quintile and third (or middle) quintile, there are 10.8%, 10.4% and 10.2%, 
respectively, of respondents who want revolt. These numbers decline more sharply as we 
rise into the top group of income earners. For the 4th quintile, 9.3% want revolt and for 
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16 The countries surveyed include almost 80 percent of the world’s population. 
the fifth (or top) quintile this proportion falls to 6.8%. 
 
Freedom 
Our data on “Freedom” come from the Freedom House organization. This is an 
independent institutional effort to monitor the progress and decline of political rights 
and civil liberties in nations across the world. The annual survey is a year-long study 
produced by regional experts, consultants, and human rights specialist to gather in-depth 
knowledge of the political transformations affecting the countries studied, meeting a 
cross-section of political parties and associations, human rights monitors, religious 
figures, representatives of both the private sector and trade union movement, academics 
and journalists. Starting in 1972, Freedom House has published an annual assessment of 
state of freedom by assigning each country and territory the status of “Not Free”, 
“Partly Free” of “Free”. This one-to-three scale is obtained as follows. 
First, political rights and civil liberties are rated separately on a seven-category 
scale, 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. A country is assigned to a 
particular numerical category based on responses to the checklist and the judgments of 
the Survey team at Freedom House. To answer the political rights questions, Freedom 
House considers the extent to which the system offers the voter the chance to make a 
free choice among candidates, and to what extent the candidates are chosen 
independently of the state. To answer the civil liberties questions, the extent of freedom 
of expression, assembly, association, and religion are considered. These are distinguished 
by an established and generally equitable system of rule of law and are comparatively free 
of extreme government indifference and corruption. In particular, Freedom House 
follows a checklist of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, although it recognizes that 
formal procedures are not the only factors that determine the real distribution of power. 
The Survey then assigns each country and territory the status of “Free,” “Partly 
Free,” or “Not Free” by averaging their political rights and civil liberties ratings. Those 
whose ratings average 1-2.5 are generally considered “Free,” 2.5-5.5 “Partly Free,” and 
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5.5-7 “Not Free”. Our variable, FREEDOM, is measured on a one-to-three discrete 
scale with the lowest value, 1, being assigned to “Not Free” countries and the highest 
value, 3, assigned to “Free” countries. We also use the two variables, POLITICAL 
RIGHTS and CIVIL LIBERTIES, which correspond to the Freedom House variables 
but are rescaled so that the lowest value, 1, is assigned to countries with the least political 
rights/civil liberties and the highest value, 7, is assigned to the countries with the most. 
For details of the checklists used for creating the scales, as well as for further 
information about their construction, see the Appendix.  
 
Religion 
The World Values Survey asks each respondent “Do you belong to a religious denomination? If 
yes, which one?”. We first defined a dummy variable, Religious, equal to one if the 
respondent identifies herself as belonging to a religious denomination and zero 
otherwise. If the respondent does belong to a religion, we next code her into three broad 
religious groupings using the dummy variables, Christian, Muslim, and Other Religion. Of 
the full sample of 99,864 people who answered this question, 65.5 per cent declare 
themselves as belonging to one of the Christian faiths (“Roman Catholic”, “Protestant” 
or “Russian/Greek Orthodox”) and 7.0 per cent declare themselves as being “Muslim”. 
The Other Religion category includes what was originally coded in the survey as being 
“Jewish”, “Hindu”, “Buddhist”, or “Other”. These four categories combined account 
for 9.9 percent of the full sample. The base category used for all these dummy variables 
is the group of people who say that they are “Not a member” or belong to “No religious 
denomination”. For more details of the exact question that was asked, see the data 
definitions in the appendix. 
 
III. 2. Data Validation 
It is possible to provide evidence that tastes for revolt are correlated with observable 
measures of conflict in society. Our dataset allows us to match the surveyed taste for 
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revolt with forms of political action that the same person has undertaken at the time of, 
or prior to, the survey. These are: “signing a petition”, “joining in boycotts”, “attending 
lawful demonstrations”, “joining unofficial strikes”, and “occupying buildings or 
factories”. The first may be taken more as an indicator of reformist action, whereas the 
other four as indicators of active involvement in changing society. We represent each 
political action by a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent has answered 
“Have done” and 0 if the answer was “Might Do” or “Would Never Do”. Since all these 
variables are measured at the individual level, there are a total of 130,278 independent 
observations measured across all the countries and years in our sample. 
Table 1.2 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between a person’s taste for 
revolt and the above indicators of actual protest. The taste for revolt is positively 
correlated with all of them, except for signing a petition. The correlation coefficients 
between taste for revolt and (a) joined in boycotts is 0.056, (b) lawfully demonstrated is 0.054, (c) 
unofficial strikes is 0.059 and (d) occupied buildings is 0.06. These coefficients are all 
significant at the 1 per cent level. In contrast, signing a petition shows a small negative 
correlation (equal to -0.007) with declaring that society must be radically changed by 
revolutionary action, significant at the 5 percent level. This makes sense if signing a 
petition is regarded as being more of a reformist act than a revolutionary one. The 
indicators of actual protest are more highly correlated with each other than with the 
declared taste for revolt. For example, the correlation coefficient between “lawfully 
demonstrated” and “joined in boycotts” is 0.37. There are two possible explanations for 
this result. First, stating the desire for a revolution may be judged more extreme than 
joining a boycott, demonstration, strike or occupation. Second, the collective action 
problem discussed in section II suggests that the mapping from preferences into actions 
is not one-to-one. 
We regress each of these four indicators of actions (joined in boycotts, lawfully 
demonstrated, unofficial strikes and occupied buildings) on the individual’s taste for revolt, 
controlling for country and year fixed effects. A declared taste for revolt is found to be a 
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significant positive factor in determining the subversive actions of individuals at the 1 
per cent level for all the measures of actual protest.17 An individual with a revolutionary 
taste has a 7 percentage point higher probability of joining in boycotts, 8 percentage 
point higher probability of demonstrating, 5 percentage point higher probability of 
joining unofficial strikes and a 3 percentage point higher probability of occupying 
buildings. 
 We also test for the relation between actual civil wars and revolutionary tastes 
using a data set of all civil wars in the world between 1944 and 1999 (see Doyle and 
Sambanis (2000)). A civil war is defined in this data set as a conflict between a 
government and a non-government claimant that has resulted in at least 1,000 deaths per 
year. There are 20 observations corresponding to countries and years in which actual 
civil wars occurred and for which we also have data on individuals’ revolutionary tastes. 
The average support for revolt in these places is 14 percentage points (compared to 9 
percentage points in the remaining sample). The Pearson correlation coefficient between 
the taste for a revolt and an actual civil war occurring in that country in the 
corresponding time period equals 0.07, significant at the 1 percent level.  
Consequently there appears a statistically significant link between an individual 
declaring that the established order should be changed by revolt and that same individual 
taking some form of revolutionary action. The size of the effect indicates that the 
majority are unwilling to take action, possibly for fear of reprisal or the presence of 
collective action problems.18 
 
IV. Empirical Strategy 
 
We relate an individual’s taste for revolt across a sample that includes 20 countries in 
1981-84, 36 countries in 1990-92 and 45 countries in 1995-97 to his or her level of 
                                                 
17 These results are available on request. 
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freedom (both civic and political), development as well as the relative income category 
(in quintiles) of each respondent. We also control for a larger set of both 
macroeconomic variables and individual characteristics. The results take advantage of 
both the cross-country and time series variation in the data.  
The probit regressions are of the form: 
 
TASTE for  = α FREEDOMct + β  GDP per CAPITAct + χ ∆ GDP per CAPITAct +  
REVOLT?ict      + δ PERSONAL  INCOME GROUPict + γ  RELIGIONict + ϕ MACROct +  
                          + λ MICROict + ηc + µt + εict 
 
where TASTE for REVOLTict is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when an 
individual, i, who lives in country c, and year t, agrees with the statement that “The entire 
way our society is organised must be radically changed by revolutionary action”. The variable, 
FREEDOMct, is an indicator of freedom measured on a 1-3 scale that assigns a country 
that is not free the value 1, a partly free country with the value 2, and a free country with 
the value 3. It comes from the annual survey by Freedom House. 
 The variable GDP per CAPITAct is used to proxy average income, Y , in equation 
(2). It is measured as per capita income, in 1992 US$, adjusted for purchasing power 
parity, in logarithms. ∆ GDP per CAPITAct is the first difference of GDP per CAPITAct. 
Since our measurements are in logs, ∆ GDP per CAPITAct also equals log(1+annual GDP 
growth rate) which approximately equals the annual GDP growth rate (for growth rates 
<10%). These data come from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. A 
person’s relative income position in a country is proxied by the variable PERSONAL 
INCOME GROUPict, which assigns an income quintile to each respondent to the revolt 
question. RELIGIONict enters both as a dummy indicating whether each person is 
religious, and also as a vector of the different religions to which he or she may belong. 
The main categories that we divide the sample into are Christian, Muslim, and Other. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
18 There also exists a significant positive relationship between reported criminal actions (as measured by both serious assault 
and auto-theft) and surveyed preferences for revolt taken across 201,940 randomly sampled people in Europe, controlling 
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The vector MACROct refers to a set of variables aggregated at the country level 
that may also affect the support for revolt. These include the Inflation Rate and Openness. 
The former is measured by the annual rate of change in consumer prices (in logs).19 The 
latter is measured by the sum of imports and exports divided by the country’s total GDP. A 
proxy for the level of education in each country is also used, Primary Education, which is the 
ratio of total enrolment in primary level education, regardless of age, to the population 
of the age group that officially corresponds to this level of education. For further details 
about how each of these variables was constructed, see the data definitions in the 
appendix. The vector MICROict refers to a set of personal characteristics of the 
respondents including their employment status, marital status, age and level of 
education. The appendix contains a complete set of data definitions. We also include ηc , 
which is to a dummy variable for each cross-sectional unit (i.e. countries) and µt , which 
is a dummy variable for each year. The (i.i.d.) error term is εict . Robust standard errors 
are computed to correct for potential heteroskedasticity and for potential correlation of 
the error term across observations that are contained within a cross sectional unit in any 
given year (see Moulton (1986)). Table 1.3 provides summary statistics of the variables 
used. 
 
Omitted Variable Bias and Exogeneity 
There are other variables that may have still have been omitted from our regressions and 
are affecting the taste for revolt. The inclusion of both country and year fixed effects in 
all our regressions goes some way to controlling for unobserved heterogeneity that could 
be biasing the results. As a further check, we attempt to control for income inequality, 
although data availability seriously constrains this task.  
Another issue is the possibility of endogeneity due, for example, to increased 
                                                                                                                                                                  
for country and year fixed effects (see MacCulloch (2000a,b)). 
19 Taking logs helps control for the effects of outliers in the sample, such as the hyperinflation during the 1980s in Argentina in 
which inflation was 630 percent per annum. 
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20 Most studies of civil war have ignored issues of endogeneity (see Sambanis (2001)). 
support for revolt resulting in changes to policies and the economy. This issue has 
received little attention in the previous literature.20 It remains unclear what sign any 
effect of higher support for revolt could have on freedom since greater revolutionary 
pressures may lead to either greater freedom or greater repression.21 It remains a 
controversy in the literature the extent to which deep preference parameters actually do 
affect policy outcomes.22 Alternatively, revolutionary tastes might be thought of as being 
a determinant of economic growth. To make this link possible, the transmission 
mechanism must run from preferences for revolt into actions and from there to changes 
in GDP. While the first part of the chain appears to exist in our data (the correlation 
coefficients between actions and preferences are, on average, equal to 0.057 and 
significant at the 1 percent level) the size of the mapping is much less than one to one. 
This could be due to collective action problems, as already outlined. Endogeneity would 
be stronger if we were using actual outcomes of civil war as a left-hand side variable, so 
our approach appears an improvement on this front. Moreover, we make a simple 
attempt to address these issues by re-estimating the above set of regressions, but 
including lagged values of Freedom rather than current ones. 
 
V. The Relationship between Revolutionary Tastes and Freedom 
 
V. 1. The Price of Freedom: Basic Results 
In Table 2.1, columns (1) to (6) present the first set of results, estimated using probit 
regressions. Marginal probabilities are reported and all regressions control for both 
country and year fixed effects. Column (1) shows the relation between the level of 
freedom in nations and the corresponding taste for revolution. The coefficient on 
Freedom is negative and significant, at the 1 per cent level. An individual living in a 
                                                 
21 As an example of the former, in early seventeenth century England, fiscal needs of the Crown led to “expropriation of wealth 
through redefinition of rights in the sovereign’s favor” and subsequently civil war. After the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the winners 
(the Whigs) sought to redesign government institutions in such a way as to control the problem of “the exercise of arbitrary and 
confiscatory power by the Crown” (North and Weingast (1989)). 
22 See, for example, Persson and Tabellini (2000). 
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country that loses one degree of freedom on a 1 to 3 scale (which is equivalent to a shift 
from a “Free” country like the United States to a “Partly Free” country like Turkey) 
experiences an increase in their probability of supporting a revolt by 3.2 percentage 
points.23 
Column (2) runs a similar regression but now includes the level of GDP per capita 
(measured in logs) as a predictor of revolutionary tastes, in addition to the level of 
Freedom. The coefficient on GDP per capita is weakly significant at the 10 percent level. 
Column (3) includes the change, as well as the level of GDP per capita. The coefficient 
on the level term remains negative but loses significance, whereas the change  term is 
negative and significant at the 5 percent level. Its size indicates a person living in a 
country that experiences a real growth rate of 10 percentage points per year is expected 
to have a 2.0 percentage points lower probability of desiring revolution than if the 
growth rate was zero (= 0.201*∆log(GDP per capita) = 0.201*log(1+growth rate) ≈ 
0.201*growth rate = 0.201*0.10 = 0.02). The coefficient of Freedom, equal to -0.035, 
remains similar in size to the previous two specifications remains and also retains its 1 
per cent level of significance. Column (3) seems to lend support to the view that 
economic growth matters more than the absolute level of income in depressing people’s 
desire for revolutionary change. 
In addition to Freedom and GDP per capita levels and changes, column (4) includes 
each individual’s relative position in the income ladder as a possible factor explaining his 
taste for revolt. The relative income position is measured in terms of quintiles. The 
results show a monotonically decreasing effect on having a revolutionary taste as one 
goes up the income groups. Relative to a person in the bottom group, rising up one 
income quintile implies a 0.4 percentage point lower probability of desiring revolt, rising 
up two quintiles implies a 0.9 percentage point lower probability of desiring revolt 
(significant at the 5 percent level), rising up three quintiles implies a 0.9 percentage point 
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23 A drop of one level of the Freedom index is also equivalent to a shift from “Partly Free” Turkey to a “Not Free” country 
like North Korea or Saudi Arabia. 
lower probability of desiring revolt (significant at the 5 percent level) and rising up four 
quintiles implies a 1.2 percentage point lower probability of desiring revolt (significant at 
the 5 percent level). Going from the bottom to the top income quintile implies a 2.0 
percentage point lower probability of desiring revolt (significant at the 1 percent level). 
This regression suggests each individual’s own position in the income distribution of a 
country, as well as the existence of aggregate economic growth, contribute to buying off 
revolutionary tastes. The coefficients on Freedom and ∆GDP per capita also remain 
negative and significant at the 1 percent level in column (4), equal to -0.036 and -0.277, 
respectively.  
Altogether, the previous regressions give a picture of freedom, economic growth 
and an individual’s relative income as shaping the taste for revolt in nations. Since both 
Freedom and the change in GDP per capita enter negatively and significantly we are able to 
calculate a marginal rate of substitution between these two variables (keeping the taste 
for revolt constant). Using the coefficients on these variables from column (4), a loss of 
one degree of freedom (on the 1 to 3 scale) increases the probability of preferring revolt 
by 3.6 percentage points and so would have to be compensated by an increase in the 
GDP per capita growth rate of 13.9 percentage points (= log-1(0.036/0.277) - 1). For 
example, the growth rate would have to rise from 1 to 14.9% per annum in order to 
keep an individual’s taste for revolt unchanged in the face of a drop of one degree in the 
level of freedom (i.e. going from the US down to Turkey or from Turkey down to Saudi 
Arabia). Even a rise from the bottom to the top of the income distribution, which 
lowers the chance of preferring a revolution by 2.0 percentage points, is insufficient to 
compensate the individual for a one-degree drop down the freedom scale. 
Finally, columns (5) and (6) in Table 2.1 repeat the basic specification in column 
(4) but use the two separate indices, Civil Liberties and the Political Rights (both based on a 
1 to 7 scale), from which the Freedom scale is derived as an average of the two. They both 
have negative and significant effects at the 1 percent level on revolutionary tastes. 
Similarly the coefficients on the Personal Income Quintiles and ∆GDP per capita are also 
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similar in size and significance to the previous columns, with the exception of the 
change in GDP per capita which loses significance in column (6).  
 
V. 2. Muslims, Christians, Income and the Taste for Revolt 
Table 2.2 investigates the role of religion, and in particular of being a Christian or a 
Muslim, on one’s taste for revolt. We first investigate whether there are different effects, 
on average, of being a member of one of these religions. We next interact freedom with 
religious affiliation to determine if members of these religions respond differently to a 
denial of their freedoms. 
Column (1) includes the dummy variable, Religious, which takes on the value 1 
when the respondents identify themselves as belonging to a religion. It also includes the 
basic set of variables measuring Freedom and income, both at the aggregate and individual 
level, which were used in column (4) of Table 1.1. A full set of country and year fixed 
effects are also present. Being religious has a negative effect on having a revolutionary 
taste, at the 1 percent level of significance. It lowers the probability that an individual 
prefers revolt by 3.0 percentage points. The coefficients on the aggregate variables, 
Freedom and ∆GDP per capita, remain similar in size and significance levels to their 
corresponding values in column (4) although the level of GDP per capita now becomes 
significant at the 10 percent level. Its magnitude, however, is only 11 percent of the 
magnitude of ∆GDP per capita. Column (2) divides individuals into three separate 
religious categories, Christian, Muslim and Other Religions. The base category is belonging 
to no religious denomination. Christians have significantly less chance of preferring 
revolt compared to people who are not religious, whereas for Muslims and other 
religions there is no difference. The coefficients on Christian, equal to -0.034, and Muslim, 
equal to -0.007, are significantly different at the 1 percent level. 
Column (3) tests for whether the taste for revolt amongst religious individuals 
differs according to the degree of freedom in their country. The evidence suggests that it 
does since the interaction term, Religious*Freedom, is negative and significant at the 10 
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percent level. In other words, whereas being religious in a “Free” country decreases an 
individual’s chance of preferring revolt by 4.5 percentage points (=0.015*3), in a “Not 
Free” country it only decreases by 1.5 percentage points (=0.015*1), when compared to 
a non-religious person. Column (4) divides religious individuals into three separate 
groups to study interaction effects. Whereas the coefficient on Muslim, which equals 
0.188, is positive and significant at the 5 percent level, the interaction term of 
Muslim*Freedom, which equals -0.062, is negative and significant at the 1 percent level. 
These two coefficients imply that being Muslim in a “Free” country has almost no effect 
on the probability of preferring a revolt compared to a non-religious person (=0.188-
3*0.062=0.002). However being Muslim in a “Not Free” country increases the 
probability of having a revolutionary taste by 12.6 percentage points compared to a non-
religious person (=0.188-1*0.062). There are strong differences between Christians and 
Muslims. Being Christian in a “Free” country decreases the probability of preferring 
revolt by 4.1 percentage points compared to a non-religious person (=0.004-3*0.015), 
but in a “Not Free” country it decreases it by only 1.1 percentage points (=0.004-
1*0.015). 24 
There does exist the possibility of differential effects on revolutionary tastes 
between being a Muslim in a country where Muslims are a majority and where they are a 
minority.25 To shed some light on this issue, Tables 1.4a and b list the countries in which 
more than 1 percent of the population is Muslim, along with the corresponding support 
for revolution across the whole sample and within the Muslim sub-sample. The overall 
average level of support for revolt amongst Muslims who live in countries where they 
are a minority is 10.6 percent. Within these countries, the average support for revolt by 
Muslims ranges from 1.7 percent in “Free” countries to 11.6 percent in “Partly Free” 
                                                 
24 The results suggest that whether or not religion is “the opium of people” as argued by Marx (1844) depends both on the 
identity of the religion and the degree of freedoms enjoyed by religious individuals. For example, although Christians do 
have, on average, a 3.4 percentage point lower probability of preferring revolution than non-religious people, this falls to a 
1.1 percentage point difference in a “Not Free” country. In the case of Muslims, there is no difference between their 
revolutionary preferences and non-religious people, but in a “Not Free” country they have a 12.6 percentage point higher 
probability of preferring revolution.  
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countries to 22.1 percent in “Not Free” countries. Within the countries where Muslims 
are a majority, no countries in the World Values Survey are classified as “Free” and the 
average support for revolt by Muslims ranges from 18.7 percent in “Partly Free” 
countries to 24.9 percent in “Not Free” countries. The overall average level of support 
for revolt by Muslims in countries where they are the majority equals 20.3 percent. 
Moreover, in a regression that includes an interaction term of freedom with the 
respondent being part of a minority there is some effect that people from a Christian or 
Muslim minority react more strongly to the denial of freedom than if they were part of 
the majority. In addition, Muslims always have a higher level of taste for revolt than 
Christians, for any combination of freedom status and minority/majority grouping.26 
We also test for the mechanism underlying the different reaction to freedom by 
Christians and Muslims by checking whether the two religious groups react differently to 
the denial of political rights or civil liberties27. The idea is that Muslims might care more 
when their political rights are taken away than when their civil liberties are, because the 
prescriptions on civil liberties that they have to follow descend directly from their 
religion and thus are more easily justified. The results lend support to this hypothesis. 
When political rights are used as the explanatory variable, Muslims react twice as 
strongly to the denial of rights than Christians. Using civil liberties, however, does not 
yield any significant result. This leads to the policy conclusion that if a government 
wants to decrease the support for revolt in countries in crisis, political rights should be 
granted, while the extent of civil liberties should not be in question. 
Columns (5) and (6) investigate the possibility that the change in GDP per capita 
might affect an individual’s taste for revolt differentially depending on whether they are 
religious or not. The reason is to test the idea that religious people may be more difficult 
to “buy off” than non-religious ones, due to their ideology. Column (5) includes the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
25 There could also be a difference between Muslims depending on whether their state is governed by an Islamic religious 
group or not, but the only country which can be strictly defined as a theocratic regime is Iran. 
26 All results not reported in tables are available on request. 
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27 We remind the reader that the freedom score is the average of the civil liberties and political rights indices. 
interaction term, Religious*∆GDP per capita, which is insignificant. The last column divides 
up religious people into Christians, Muslims and Other Religions. The coefficients on the 
interaction terms of these first two groups with ∆GDP per capita are also both 
insignificant. There is a weak effect (at the 10 percent level) of economic growth leading 
to a stronger reduction in the taste for revolt amongst the Other Religious groups.28 
 
VI. Further Checks and Tests on the Results 
 
VI. 1. Weighted Least Squares 
The World Values Survey uses a stratified multi-stage random sampling method and has 
approximately 1,500 respondents for each survey in each country. Thus, every country’s 
survey gives a representative picture of that whole country. Nevertheless, by giving each 
of the respondents an equal weight, we tend to underestimate the weight of large 
countries and overestimate that of small countries. In order to give a picture of the 
whole world population that reflects the true mix of its characteristics we repeat the 
whole set of regressions using weighted least squares, where the sampling weights used 
denote the inverse of the probability that an individual is included in his or her country 
sample due to the above sampling design.29 
The results are consistent with the above findings. All the effects remain 
consistently valid, while some become reinforced. The effect of average income in 
decreasing support for revolt becomes stronger and significant at the 1 percent level 
throughout all the specifications. The difference between Muslims and Christians in their 
reaction to the denial of freedom remains significant, although the size of the difference 
becomes smaller. The coefficients imply that being Muslim in a “Free” country decreases 
the probability of having a revolutionary taste by 5.3 percentage points compared to a 
                                                 
28 We also tested for interaction effects between the level of GDP per capita and the different religious groups. These are not 
significant (available on request). 
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29 In particular this procedure ensures that the results reflect the true proportions of the different religious groups in the 
world (where Muslims represent 22% and Christians 33% of people). 
non-religious person (the effect equals zero in the non-weighted regressions). However 
being Muslim in a “Not Free” country increases the probability of having a revolutionary 
taste by 4.1 percentage points compared to a non-religious person (the effect equals 12.6 
percent in the non-weighted case). Being Christian in a “Free” country decreases the 
probability of preferring revolt by 9.3 percentage points compared to a non-religious 
person, but in a “Not Free” country it decreases it by only 3.1 percentage points. Using 
weighted least squares there also now exists a differential effect depending on whether 
the respondent is in a minority religious group. For example, being in a Christian or 
Muslim minority increases the support for revolt by 5 percentage points (there was no 
significant effect in the non-weighted case). 
 
VI. 2. Adding More Controls and Endogeneity 
Table 2.3 performs a set of robustness checks on the above specifications of the 
determinants of the taste for revolt. We focus on the basic specification that includes the 
variables, Freedom, the level and change in GDP per capita, Personal Income Quintile and 
Religious. Column (1) includes three macroeconomic controls: the inflation rate, openness 
to trade and the level of primary education in the country. The effects of freedom, GDP 
per capita, personal income and religion on revolutionary tastes all remain similar in size 
and significance to their values reported in the previous tables. More inflation and 
openness both have negative effects on the support for revolt at the 5 percent level, 
while the level of primary education in the country has no significant impact.30 For 
example, an increase in the inflation rate from 1 to 11 percentage points decreases the 
chance of desiring revolt by 2.9 percentage points and an increase in openness of 10 
percentage points decreases the chance of desiring revolt by 1.4 percentage points. To 
further investigate the negative effects of the Inflation Rate and Openness, we interact each 
of these variables with the personal income quintiles. The interaction terms with Openness 
are all insignificant. Inflation, on the other hand, has a different impact across the 
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different quintiles. It has less effect on reducing the taste for revolt for individuals in the 
top quintile relative to the bottom quintile. 
Columns (3) and (4) expand the set of possible controls to also include a set of 
individual characteristics. In column (3), employment status has strong effects on one’s 
taste for revolt. Compared to working, being unemployed or a student increase the 
probability of supporting revolt by 2.0 and 1.7 percentage points, respectively.31 Being 
retired or a housewife decreases the probability of supporting revolt by 2.5 and 1.9 
percentage points, respectively. These four coefficients are all significant at the 1 percent 
level. The effects of our basic set of aggregate variables (Freedom plus the level and 
change in GDP per capita) remain almost unchanged. Column (4) also includes controls 
for an individual’s marital status, age, gender, schooling and number of children. Being 
married or widowed (compared to being single) or older than 25 years reduces one’s 
taste for revolt. On the other hand, being male or having one child only, increases 
support for revolt. These last two regressions test for robustness of our basic model 
using over 70 additional control variables simultaneously (including country and year 
effects). 
In addition to controlling for unobserved heterogeneity by the inclusion of both 
country and year dummies, as a further check on the results we also tried controlling for 
the effects of income inequality using the Deininger and Squire (1996) data set. Due to 
limited availability of the “high quality” series of Gini coefficients for the countries and 
years in our sample, we could only exploit 18.9 percent of the size of the original sample. 
This small data set provides us with too few country/year observations to reliably 
identify effects on inequality, freedom and GDP per capita on revolutionary tastes 
including fixed effects. Consequently we proceed by linearly interpolating the inequality 
data, although for a number of countries income inequality data are unavailable for any 
year. In a regression explaining the taste for revolt, the coefficient on the level of Income 
                                                                                                                                                                  
30 If greater openness reduces rents by making the domestic economy more competitive, this could explain its negative 
effect to the degree that conflict is caused by rent-seeking behavior (see, for example, Collier and Hoeffler (2000)). 
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31 Aggregate unemployment rate data are unavailable for the majority of the countries and years in our sample. 
Inequality (as measured by the Gini) is positive and significant at the 10 percent level 
(using 80,790 observations of individuals). In other words, there is some evidence that 
greater inequality exacerbates revolutionary tastes. The coefficient on Freedom in this 
regression equals -0.047, significant at the 1 percent level, and on ∆GDP per capita equals 
-0.650, significant at the 1 percent level. There is also a monotonically declining effect on 
the probability of preferring revolt as one goes up the income quintiles. In addition, we 
have explored the possibility that economic growth may affect tastes for revolt 
differently if accompanied by greater or smaller inequality, but we have not obtained any 
robust result. 
In a simple attempt to address the endogeneity issue, we repeat the whole analysis 
using a lagged value of Freedom. The results are consistent with the ones obtained 
previously. In particular, in the same regression specification as in column (4) of Table 
2.3, the coefficient on Freedom (t-1) is equal to -0.016, which is still significant the 1 
percent level (compared with -0.027 in the corresponding specification using the current 
level of Freedom). 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
This paper takes a new approach to help answer an old and unsettled question on civil 
conflict: what is the relative importance of political freedoms compared to economic 
development? It also studies whether there are differences between the two main 
religious groups in the sample, Christians and Muslims. To do so, we introduce a micro-
data set based on surveys of the revolutionary tastes of 130,000 people living in 61 
nations between 1981 and 1997. The approach differs from previous studies that have 
typically used aggregate level data on actual civil wars. 
We provide several different types of evidence that tastes for revolt are correlated 
with observable measures of conflict in society. These include matching the surveyed 
tastes with forms of political action that the same person has undertaken. These include 
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joining in boycotts, attending demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes and occupying 
buildings or factories. The correlation coefficients between these actions and a person’s 
taste for revolt are strongly significant at the 1 per cent level and lie between 0.05 and 
0.06. Using a separate data set on civil wars in countries, we find that the correlation 
coefficient between the taste for revolt and an actual civil war occurring in that country 
over the corresponding time period is equal to 0.07, significant at the 1 percent level. 
 We next study the determinants of revolutionary tastes. Controlling for the 
personal characteristics of the respondents, country fixed effects, year fixed effects and 
using both weighted and unweighted least squares, less people support revolt when they 
live in a country that is relatively free or has a high level of GDP per capita growth. An 
individual living in a country that loses one degree of freedom on a 1 to 3 scale 
(equivalent to a drop from the US to Turkey or from Turkey down to Saudi Arabia) 
experiences an increase in their probability of preferring a revolution of 3.6 percentage 
points. This would have to be compensated by an increase in the GDP per capita growth 
rate of 13.9 percentage points in order to keep the individual’s taste for revolt 
unchanged. There also exists a monotonically decreasing effect on revolutionary tastes as 
one goes up the income groups. Going from the bottom to the top income quintile 
implies a 2.0 percentage point lower probability of desiring revolt. 
There are strong effects of religious affiliation on revolutionary tastes. Religion 
lowers the probability that an individual prefers revolt by, on average, 3.0 percentage 
points. Strong differences exist between Christians and Muslims. Being Muslim in a 
“Free” country has almost no effect on the probability of preferring a revolt compared 
to a non-religious person. However being Muslim in a “Not Free” country increases the 
probability of having a revolutionary taste by 12.6 percentage points compared to a non-
religious person. Being Christian in a “Free” country decreases the probability of 
preferring revolt by 4.1 percentage points, compared to a non-religious person, and in a 
“Not Free” country decreases it by 1.1 percentage points. These results occur most 
strongly on the political rights (rather than the civil liberties) component of freedom. 
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Table 1.1 
Tastes for Revolution: 61 nations, 1981 to 1997. 
TASTE for   Religious? If religious: 
REVOLT? All Unemployed Yes No 
Christia
n 
Musli
m 
Othe
r 
        
Yes 9.8 14.1 9.2 10.3 7.8 18.3 12.9 
        
No 90.2 85.9 90.8 89.7 92.2 81.7 87.1 
        
 
 
TASTE for Income Quintiles 
REVOLT? 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
 (Lowest)    (Highest) 
      
Yes 10.8 10.4 10.2 9.3 6.9 
      
No 89.2 89.6 89.8 90.7 93.1 
      
Note: All figures are based on the full sample of 130,278 people and are 
expressed as percentages. In the religion category, “Other” includes what was 
originally coded in the World Values Survey as “Jew”, “Hindu”, “Buddhist” or 
“Other”. 
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Table 1.2 
Correlation Coefficients between Tastes for Revolt and 
Revolutionary Actions: 61 nations, 1981 to 1997. 
 Taste Signed a Joined in Lawfully Unofficial Occupied 
 for Petition boycotts demonstrated strikes buildings/ 
 Revolt?     factories 
Taste for Revolt? 1      
Signed a petition -0.007 1     
Joined in boycotts 0.056 0.294 1    
Lawfully demonstrated 0.054 0.311 0.368 1   
Unofficial strikes 0.059 0.165 0.291 0.328 1  
Occupied 
buildings/factories 
0.060 0.112 0.211 0.210 0.307 1 
Note: All figures are based on the full sample of 130,278 people. 
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Table 1.3 
Summary Statistics 
      
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
      
TASTE for REVOLT? 130,278 0.098 0.297 0 1 
RELIGIOUS 99,864    0.827 0.378 0    1 
   - CHRISTIAN 99,864    0.655 0.475 0    1 
   - MUSLIM 99,864    0.070 0.255 0    1 
   - OTHER RELIGION 99,864    0.099 0.299 0    1 
FREEDOM 102 2.61 0.60 1 3 
POLITICAL RIGHTS 102 5.80 1.58 1 7 
CIVIL LIBERTIES 102 5.44 1.54 1 7 
GDP per CAPITA (raw level) 98 11,043 6,803 748 25,644 
GDP per CAPITA (in logs) 98 9.04 0.85 6.62 10.15 
∆ GDP per CAPITA (in logs) 97 -3.7e-3 0.04 -0.11 0.10 
INFLATION RATE (in logs) 97 2.56 1.63 -1.19 8.86 
TRADE OPENNESS 97 0.36 0.28 0 1.19 
PRIMARY EDUCATION 97 1.03 0.09 0.69 1.25 
      
Note: These figures are based on World Values Survey data from the following 61 countries: 
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, 
East and Unified Germany, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, 
United Kingdom, Georgia, Ghana, Croatia, Hungary, India, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, South 
Korea, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Mexico, Macedonia, Nigeria, The Netherlands, Norway, 
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, Portugal, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Sweden, Turkey, Taiwan, Ukraine, Uruguay, United States of America, Venezuela, Serbia (ex-
Yugoslavia), South Africa. The three waves of the WVS used were taken in 1981-84, 1990-92 
and 1995-97. 
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Table 1.4a 
Revolutionary Tastes in Countries with more than 1 percent Muslims in the Sample  
 
Country 
 
Freedom 
Status 
Percentage of all 
people with a 
Revolutionary Taste
Percentage of 
Muslims 
in the Sample 
Percentage of 
Muslims with a 
Revolutionary Taste
Australia Free 5.2 1.3 0 
Bulgaria 1997 Free 6.6 11.8 1.5 
Finland Free 2.2 2.5 0 
Slovenia Free 10.4 1.3 5.0 
South Africa 1996 Free 12.1 2.1 1.8 
Bulgaria 1990 Partly Free 22.1 6.6 3.9 
Bosnia-Herzeg. Partly Free 15.4 27.3 10.1 
Croatia Partly Free 4.8 1.2 0 
Georgia Partly Free 9.4 4.0 13.2 
Ghana Partly Free 13.3 5.3 0 
India Partly Free 14.5 8.5 12.9 
Macedonia Partly Free 12.4 24.3 31.9 
Nigeria  Partly Free 28.1 24.8 25.7 
Russia Partly Free 13.9 2.6 9.6 
South Africa 1990 Partly Free 15.9 10.3 18.3 
Taiwan Partly Free 2.9 2.8 2.5 
Bangladesh Partly Free 10.8 85.9 10.5 
Pakistan Partly Free 29.1 81.9 28.7 
Turkey Partly Free 18.7 95.6 17.0 
China Not Free 5.2 1.3 7.7 
Serbia (ex-Yug.) Not Free 12.8 5.8 12.7 
South Africa 1982 Not Free 16.0 5.7 46.0 
Azerbaijan Not Free 23.5 91.6 24.9 
 
Table 1.4b 
Average Revolutionary Taste of Muslims by Country Freedom Status 
 Freedom Status of Country 
Countries where… Free Partly Free Not Free 
Muslims are the Majority - 18.7 24.9 
Muslims are a Minority 1.7 11.6 22.1 
Note: All numbers are expressed as percentages of the number of Muslims living in the country. 
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Table 2.1 
How the Taste for Revolt varies with Freedom and GDP across 61 nations, 1981 to 997. 
Dep. Variable: TASTE for REVOLT? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Freedom -0.032** -0.037** -0.035** -0.036** 
 (3.54) (3.90) (3.42) (3.69) 
  
        Civil Liberties  -0.017**
  (5.23)
  
        Political Rights  -0.017**
  (4.11)
  
GDP per capita -0.032 -0.035 -0.032 -6.7e-4 0.004
 (1.63) (1.53) (1.57) (0.03) (0.20)
  
∆ GDP per capita -0.201* -0.277** -0.245* 0.014
 (1.95) (2.46) (2.14) (0.11)
  
Personal Income Quintile - Second -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
 (1.26) (1.09) (1.27)
  
                                           Third -0.009* -0.008 -0.009*
 (1.98) (1.85) (1.93)
  
                           Fourth -0.012* -0.012* -0.013**
 (2.35) (2.31) (2.43)
  
                                 Fifth (top) -0.020** -0.020** -0.021**
 (3.40) (3.42) (3.39)
  
  
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
  
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
  
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Observations 130,278 124,327 123,558 105,411 105,411 105,411
Notes: [1] All the regressions are Probits. [2] Marginal Probabilities are reported. Absolute values of t-
statistics are in parentheses. [3] Bold-face denotes significant at the 10 percent level; Single-starred 
bold-face at the 5 per cent level; Double-starred bold face at the 1 percent level. [4] The baseline 
category for the relative income position of the individual is the first (or bottom) quintile. 
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Table 2.2 
How the Taste for Revolt varies with Freedom, GDP and Religion in 61 nations, 1981-
1997. 
Dep. Variable: TASTE for REVOLT? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Freedom -0.032** -0.031** -0.020** -0.027** -0.033** -0.032**
 (3.71) (3.78) (1.64) (2.94) (3.75) (4.67) 
GDP per capita -0.032 -0.033 -0.035 -0.038 -0.031 -0.035
 (1.72) (1.76) (1.74) (1.89) (1.67) (1.88) 
∆ GDP per capita -0.292** -0.291** -0.301** -0.271** -0.234* -0.256**
 (2.55) (2.61) (2.52) (2.87) (1.94) (2.62) 
Personal Income Quintile- Second -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
 (1.25) (1.21) (1.24) (1.27) (1.25) (1.23) 
                                    Third -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* -0.009* -0.010* -0.010*
  (2.41) (2.34) (2.40) (2.37) (2.41) (2.37) 
                                    Fourth -0.012** -0.012* -0.012* -0.012** -0.012** -0.012*
                        (2.43) (2.32) (2.42) (2.43) (2.44) (2.28) 
                                  Fifth (top) -0.020** -0.019** -0.020** -0.019** -0.020** -0.019**
 (3.59) (3.54) (3.59) (3.58) (3.60) (3.51) 
Religious -0.030** 0.010  0.030**
 (5.24)  (0.46)  (5.39)  
               Christian -0.034** 0.004 -0.034**
  (6.13)  (0.25)  (6.27) 
               Muslim -0.007 0.188* -0.009
  (0.38)  (2.23)  (0.51) 
               Other Religion -0.005 -0.033 -0.008
  (0.60)  (1.87)  (1.07) 
Religious * Freedom -0.015  
   (1.82)    
            Christian * Freedom -0.015* 
    (2.25)   
             Muslim * Freedom -0.062** 
    (2.58)   
             Other Religion * Freedom 0.014 
    (1.46)   
Religious * ∆GDP per capita  -0.062
     (0.89)  
     Christian*∆GDP per capita  0.015
      (0.18) 
     Muslim*∆GDP per capita  -0.274
      (0.72) 
     Other Relig. *∆GDP per capita  -0.297
      (1.87) 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08
Observations 99,864 99,864 99,864 99,864 99,864 99,864
Notes: [1] All the regressions are Probits. [2] Marginal Probabilities are reported. Absolute values of t-
statistics are in parentheses. [3] Bold-face denotes significant at the 10% level; Single-starred bold-face at the 
5% level; Double-starred bold face at the 1% level. [4] The baseline category for the relative income position 
of the individual is the First (bottom) quintile and for the religion variables is declaring one-self as belonging 
to no religious denomination. 
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Table 2.3 
How the Taste for Revolt varies with Freedom, GDP and Religion in 61 Nations,  
1981 to 1997: Adding More Controls. 
Dep. Variable: TASTE for REVOLT? (1) (2) (3) (4)
Freedom -0.033** -0.032** -0.033** -0.027**
 (4.83) (4.89) (4.62) (3.33)
GDP per capita -0.038* -0.041** -0.037* -0.007
 (2.25) (2.45) (2.15) (0.23)
∆ GDP per capita -0.429** -0.434** -0.414** -0.001
 (2.73) (2.74) (2.45) (0.01)
Personal Income Quintile -Second -0.004 -0.021** -0.004 -8.6e-5
 (1.18) (2.71) (1.44) (0.02)
                                        Third -0.009* -0.033** -0.011** -0.009*
 (2.26) (4.04) (2.94) (1.98)
                           Fourth -0.011* -0.026** -0.014** -0.014**
 (2.19) (2.51) (3.07) (2.39)
                                  Fifth (top) -0.018** -0.041** -0.022** -0.016**
 (3.19) (2.99) (4.24) (2.43)
Religious -0.032** -0.031** -0.028** -0.022**
 (6.10) (5.98) (5.66) (4.55)
MACRO CONTROLS  
Inflation Rate -0.012* -0.017** -0.011* -0.014**
 (2.34) (3.27) (2.32) (4.71)
Openness -0.142* -0.143* -0.139* -0.177**
 (2.12) (2.11) (2.06) (2.83)
Primary Education 0.036 0.022 0.029 0.036
 (0.97) (0.57) (0.74) (0.65)
Inflation * 2nd Income Quintile 0.005**  
 (2.99)  
Inflation * 3rd Income Quintile 0.007**  
 (3.51)  
Inflation * 4th Income Quintile 0.006**  
 (2.50)  
Inflation * 5th Income Quintile (top) 0.008**  
 (2.68)  
Openness * 2nd Income Quintile 0.011  
 (0.83)  
Openness * 3rd Income Quintile 0.019  
 (1.62)  
Openness * 4th Income Quintile -0.004  
 (0.27)  
Openness * 5th Income Quintile (top) 0.023  
 (1.09)  
MICRO CONTROLS  
Employment Status  
                          - Unemployed 0.020** 0.014**
 (3.78) (2.46)
                          - Self-employed -0.001 8.6e-4
 (0.28) (0.21)
continued on next page …  
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… continued from previous page  
Dep. Var: TASTE for REVOLT? (1) (2) (3) (4)
                          - Retired -0.025** -0.006
 (5.93) (1.15) 
                          - Student 0.017** 0.008
 (4.02) (0.76)
                          - Housewife -0.019** 0.003
 (3.93) (0.60)
                          - Other 0.012 0.017
 (1.25) (1.80)
Marital status     - Married  -0.020**
                             (2.75)
                          - Divorced  -0.006
  (0.67)
                          - Separated  -0.003
  (0.38)
                          - Widowed  -0.017*
  (2.34)
Age                 - Middle (26-50 years old)  -0.007
  (1.68)
                          -  Old (> 50 years old)  -0.020**
  (4.03)
Male  0.019**
  (5.10)
Age Finished School:  12-14 years old  -0.004
  (0.70)
                                  15-18 years old  -0.002
  (0.32)
                                  19-21 years old  7.3e-5
                                      (0.01)
                                  > 21 years old  -0.006
  (0.81)
Number of Children:  1  0.019*
                                       (2.22)
                                  2  0.012
  (1.29)
                                 > 3  0.013
  (1.41)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10
Observations 98,963 98,963 98,281 62,674
Notes: [1] All regressions are Probits. Marginal Probabilities are reported. Absolute 
values of t-statistics in parentheses. [3] Bold-face denotes significant at the 10% level; 
Single-starred bold at the 5% level; Double-starred bold at the 1% level. [4] The baseline 
category for the individual income position is the First (or bottom) quintile, for Religious 
is declaring one-self as belonging to no religious denomination, for Employment Status is a 
working employee, for Marital Status is single, for Age is young, for Age Finished School is 
to have stopped school before being 12 years old, and for Number of children is no 
children. 
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Appendix 
Survey Descriptions  
 
World Values Survey and European Values Survey (1981-1984, 1990-1992, 1995-1997) 
The Combined World Values Survey is produced by the Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI, USA. 
The series is designed to enable a cross-national comparison of values and norms on a wide variety of norms 
and to monitor changes in values and attitudes across the globe. Both national random and quota sampling 
were used. All of the surveys were carried out through face-to-face interviews, with a sampling universe 
consisting of all adult citizens, aged 18 and older, across over 60 nations around the world. 
These surveys are being expanded to provide a more complete cross-sectional, as well as time series, 
dimension. The 1981-83 survey covered 22 independent countries plus surveys in Northern Ireland and 
Tambov oblast of the Russian republic; the 1990-93 survey covered 42 independent countries plus surveys in 
Northern Ireland, and Greater Moscow; the 1995-97 survey covered 53 independent countries, plus surveys 
in Puerto Rico, Tambov oblast, Montenegro, the Andalusian, Basque, Galician and Valencian regions of 
Spain and a pilot survey in Ghana. In all, 64 independent countries have been surveyed in at least one wave of 
this investigation (counting East Germany as an independent country, which it was when first surveyed). 
These countries include almost 80 percent of the world’s population. A fourth wave of surveys is being 
carried out in 1999-2000. 
The full set of countries covered by the survey is as follows: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Czech Republic, East and Unified Germany, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Spain, 
Estonia, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Georgia, Ghana, Croatia, Hungary, India, Ireland, Northern 
Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Lithuania, Latvia, Madagascar, Mexico, Macedonia, Mongolia, The 
Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, Portugal, Russia, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, Taiwan, Ukraine, Uruguay, United States of America, Venezuela, South Africa, 
Moscow, Tambov oblast, Montenegro, the Andalusian, Basque, Galician and Valencian regions in Spain, 
Nigeria, Romania, Moldova and Serbia (ex- Yugoslavia). 
 
Freedom House Survey 
Freedom in the World is an institutional effort by the Freedom House organization to monitor the progress 
and decline of political rights and civil liberties in 192 nations and 60 related and disputed territories. The 
annual survey is a year-long effort produced by regional experts, consultants, and human rights specialists. 
Throughout the year, Freedom House personnel regularly conduct fact-finding missions to gain more in-
depth knowledge of the political transformations affecting the countries studied, meeting a cross-section of 
political parties and associations, human rights monitors, religious figures, representatives of both the private 
sector and trade union movement, academics and journalists. Since 1972, Freedom House has published an 
annual assessment of state of freedom by assigning each country and territory the status of “Free”, “Partly 
Free”, or “Not Free” by averaging their political rights and civil liberties ratings. First, political rights and civil 
liberties are rated separately on a seven-category scale, 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. A 
country is assigned to a particular numerical category based on responses to the checklist and the judgments 
of the Survey team at Freedom House. To answer the political rights questions, Freedom House considers 
the extent to which the system offers the voter the chance to make a free choice among candidates, and to 
what extent the candidates are chosen independently of the state. In particular, it follows a “checklist” of 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties, although it recognizes that formal electoral procedures are not the only 
factors that determine the real distribution of power. The more that people suffer under domination by 
unelected forces such as the military or the king, the less chance the country has of receiving credit for self-
determination in the Survey.  
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The Political Rights Checklist includes:  
1. Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through free and fair 
elections?  
2. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?  
3. Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and honest tabulation of 
ballots?  
4. Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power?  
5. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political 
groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or 
groupings?  
6. Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility for the 
opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?  
7. Are the people free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious 
hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?  
8. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-determination, self-
government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making process?  
9. For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system provide for 
consultation with the people, encourage discussion of policy, and allow the right to petition the 
ruler?  
10. Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or 
territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group?  
 
Political Rights Ratings 
Political Rights are rated on a scale from 1 to 7. Countries and territories which receive a rating of 1 for 
political rights come closest to the ideals suggested by the checklist questions, beginning with free and fair 
elections. Those who are elected rule, there are competitive parties or other political groupings, and the 
opposition plays an important role and has actual power. Citizens enjoy self-determination or an extremely 
high degree of autonomy (in the case of territories), and minority groups have reasonable self-government or 
can participate in the government through informal consensus. Countries and territories rated 2 in political 
rights are less free than those rated 1. Such factors as gross political corruption, violence, political 
discrimination against minorities, and foreign or military influence on politics may be present and weaken the 
quality of democracy. The same conditions which undermine freedom in countries and territories with a 
rating of 2 may also weaken political rights in those with a rating of 3, 4, or 5. Other damaging elements can 
include civil war, heavy military involvement in politics, lingering royal power, unfair elections, and one-party 
dominance. However, states and territories in these categories may still enjoy some elements of political 
rights, including the freedom to organize quasi-political groups, reasonably free referenda, or other significant 
means of popular influence on government. Countries and territories with political rights rated 6 have 
systems ruled by military juntas, one-party dictatorships, religious hierarchies, or autocrats. These regimes 
may allow only a minimal manifestation of political rights, such as competitive local elections or some degree 
of representation or autonomy for minorities. Some countries and territories rated 6 are in the early or 
aborted stages of democratic transition. For countries and territories with a rating of 7, political rights are 
absent or virtually nonexistent due to the extremely oppressive nature of the regime or severe oppression in 
combination with civil war. States and territories in this group may also be marked by extreme violence or 
warlord rule which dominates political power in the absence of an authoritative, functioning central 
government. 
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The Civil Liberties Checklist includes: 
A. Freedom of Expression and Belief  
1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note: in cases where the 
media are state-controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the Survey gives the system credit.)  
2. Are there free religious institutions and is there free private and public religious expression?  
B. Association and Organizational Rights 
1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?  
2. Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization? (Note: this includes political parties, civic 
organizations, ad hoc issue groups, etc.)  
3. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective 
bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?  
C. Rule of Law and Human Rights  
1. Is there an independent judiciary?  
2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Is the population treated equally under the law? 
Are police under direct civilian control?  
3. Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups 
that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies? (Note: freedom from war 
and insurgencies enhances the liberties in a free society, but the absence of wars and insurgencies does not in 
and of itself make a not free society free.)  
4. Is there freedom from extreme government indifference and corruption?  
D. Personal Autonomy and Economic Rights  
1. Is there open and free private discussion?  
2. Is there personal autonomy? Does the state control travel, choice of residence, or choice of 
employment? Is there freedom from indoctrination and excessive dependency on the state?  
3. Are property rights secure? Do citizens have the right to establish private businesses? Is private business 
activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, or organized crime?  
4. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of 
family?  
5. Is there equality of opportunity, including freedom from exploitation by or dependency on landlords, 
employers, union leaders, bureaucrats, or other types of obstacles to a share of legitimate economic gains?  
 
Civil Liberties Ratings 
When analyzing the civil liberties checklist, Freedom House does not mistake constitutional guarantees of 
human rights for those rights in practice. Countries and territories which receive a rating of 1 come closest to 
the ideals expressed in the civil liberties checklist, including freedom of expression, assembly, association, and 
religion. They are distinguished by an established and generally equitable system of rule of law and are 
comparatively free of extreme government indifference and corruption. Countries and territories with this 
rating enjoy free economic activity and tend to strive for equality of opportunity. States and territories with a 
rating of 2 have deficiencies in three or four aspects of civil liberties, but are still relatively free. Countries and 
territories which have received a rating of 3, 4, or 5 range from those that are in at least partial compliance 
with virtually all checklist standards to those with a combination of high or medium scores for some 
questions and low or very low scores on other questions. The level of oppression increases at each successive 
rating level, particularly in the areas of censorship, political terror, and the prevention of free association. 
There are also many cases in which groups opposed to the state engage in political terror that undermines 
other freedoms. Therefore, a poor rating for a country is not necessarily a comment on the intentions of the 
government, but may reflect real restrictions on liberty caused by nongovernmental terror. Countries and 
territories rated 6 are characterized by a few partial rights, such as some religious and social freedoms, some 
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highly restricted private business activity, and relatively free private discussion. In general, people in these 
states and territories experience severely restricted expression and association, and there are almost always 
political prisoners and other manifestations of political terror. States and territories with a rating of 7 have 
virtually no freedom. An overwhelming and justified fear of repression characterizes these societies.  
 
Almost without exception in the Survey, countries and territories have ratings in political rights and civil 
liberties that are within two ratings numbers of each other. A society that does not have free individual and 
group expression in nonpolitical matters is not likely to make an exception for political ones. 
 
Free, Partly Free, Not Free 
The Survey then assigns each country and territory the status of “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free” by 
averaging their political rights and civil liberties ratings. Those whose ratings average 1-2.5 are generally 
considered “Free,” 2.5-5.5 “Partly Free,” and 5.5-7 “Not Free.” The dividing line between “Partly Free” and 
“Not Free” usually falls within the group whose ratings numbers average 5.5. For example, countries that 
receive a rating of 6 for political rights and 5 for civil liberties, or a 5 for political rights and a 6 for civil 
liberties, could be either “Partly Free” or “Not Free.” The total number of raw points derived from the 
original checklist is the definitive factor which determines the final status. It should be emphasized that the 
“Free,” “Partly Free,” and “Not Free” labels are highly simplified terms that each cover a broad third of the 
available raw points. Therefore, countries and territories within each category, especially those at either end of 
each category, can have quite different human rights situations. In order to see the distinctions within each 
category, one should examine a country or territory’s political rights and civil liberties ratings.  
  
More information on the methodology can be found on the web-site: 
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/methodology.htm 
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Data Definitions 
 
TASTE for REVOLT?: A dummy variable that equals 1 when the survey respondent answers 
that “The entire way our society is organised must be radically changed by revolutionary action”, and 
equals 0 when the respondent answers that either “Our society must be gradually improved by 
reforms” or “Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces”. The 
source is the World Values Survey (1980-1997). 
FREEDOM: An index measured on a one-to-three discrete scale with the lowest value, 1, 
being assigned to “Not Free” countries and the highest value, 3, assigned to “Free” 
countries. The index is a composite measure obtained by averaging the two separate 
indices, Political Rights and Civil Liberties. For further information, see the Appendix 
(from the Freedom House organization). 
POLITICAL RIGHTS: As index whose lowest value, 1, is assigned to countries with the least 
political rights and the highest value, 7, is assigned to the countries with the most. 
Countries are assigned to a particular numerical category based on responses to the 
checklist and the judgments of the Survey team at Freedom House. To answer the 
political rights questions, the extent to which the system offers the voter the chance to 
make a free choice among candidates, and to what extent the candidates are chosen 
independently of the state, is considered. For more information about the “checklist” 
of political rights, see the Appendix. 
CIVIL LIBERTIES: As index whose lowest value, 1, is assigned to countries with the least 
civil liberties and the highest value, 7, is assigned to the countries with the most. 
Countries are assigned to a particular numerical category based on responses to the 
checklist and the judgments of the Survey team at Freedom House. To answer the civil 
liberties questions, the extent of freedom of expression, assembly, association, and 
religion are considered. These are distinguished by an established and generally 
equitable system of rule of law and are comparatively free of extreme government 
indifference and corruption. For more information about the checklist of civil liberties, 
see the Appendix. 
GDP per capita: GDP per capita, with Purchasing Power Parity adjustment, in constant 1992 
US$, and measured in logs. The source is the World Development Indicators of the 
World Bank. 
∆ GDP per capita: The first difference of GDP per capita (with PPP adjustment, in constant 
1992 US$). The source is the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. 
INCOME QUINTILE: This heading refers to a set of 4 dummy variables which take the 
value 1 depending on which income quintile the respondent’s family income belongs 
to. The base category is the lowest income quintile (from World Values Survey). 
RELIGIOUS: A dummy variable that equals 1 when the survey respondent answers yes to the 
question “Do you belong to a religious denomination? If yes, which one?”. The specific categories 
of religion listed in the remainder of the question were “1. Roman Catholic 2. Protestant 3. 
Orthodox (Russian/Greek) 4. Jews 5. Muslim 6. Hindu 7. Buddhist 8. Other”. The base 
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category is people who answer “0. Not a member” or “No religious denomination” (from 
World Values Survey).  
CHRISTIAN: A dummy variable that equals 1 when the survey respondent declares herself as 
belonging to one the following three religious groups: “1. Roman Catholic 2. Protestant 3. 
Orthodox (Russian/Greek)”. 
MUSLIM: A dummy variable that equals 1 when the survey respondent declares herself as 
belonging to “5. Muslim” (from World Values Survey). 
OTHER RELIGION: A dummy variable that equals 1 when the survey respondent declares 
herself as belonging one of the following religious groups “4. Jews 5. Muslim 6. Hindu 7. 
Buddhist 8. Other” (from World Values Survey). 
INFLATION RATE: The inflation rate, as measured by the annual rate of change in 
consumer prices, measured in logs. The source is the World Development Indicators 
of the World Bank. 
OPENNESS: It is measured as the absolute sum of imports and exports as a ratio to GDP. 
The source is the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. 
PRIMARY EDUCATION: Gross enrolment ratio is the ratio of total enrolment, regardless 
of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of 
education shown. Primary education provides children with basic reading, writing, and 
mathematics skills along with an elementary understanding of such subjects as history, 
geography, natural science, social science, art, and music. The source is the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank. 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS: A set of dummy variables taking the value 1 depending on the 
respondent’s employment status: “Unemployed”, “Self-employed”, “Retired”, 
“Student”, “Housewife” or “Other”. The base category is “Employed” (from World 
Values Survey). 
MARITAL STATUS: A set of dummy variables taking the value 1 depending on the 
respondent’s marital status: “Married”, “Divorced”, “Separated” or “Widowed”. The 
base category is “Never Married”. 
AGE: A set of dummy variables corresponding to the respondent’s age: “Middle” which 
corresponds to 26-50 years old, “Old” which corresponds to greater than 50 years old. 
The base category is “Young” which corresponds to less than 26 years old (from 
World Values Survey). 
MALE: A dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent is male and 0 otherwise (from 
World Values Survey). 
AGE FINISHED SCHOOL: This heading refers to a set of dummy variables which take the 
value 1 depending on the age at which the respondent finished full-time education: up 
to “12-14 years old”, “15-18 years old”, “19-21 years old” or up to “more than 21 years 
old”. The base category is education up to, but not including, 12 years old (from World 
Values Survey). 
NUMBER OF CHILDREN: The number of children living in the household: 1, 2 or more 
than 2. The base category is zero (from World Values Survey). 
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Data summary  
Country Year Freedom Status Proportion of people with a Revolutionary Preference
    
Argentina 1984 Free 12.4 
Argentina 1991 Free 7.5 
Argentina 1995 Free 5.1 
Armenia 1997 Partly Free 16.0 
Australia 1981 Free 4.4 
Australia 1995 Free 5.7 
Austria 1990 Free 2.2 
Azerbaijan 1996 Not Free 23.5 
Bangladesh 1996 Partly Free 10.8 
Belarus 1996 Not Free 3.7 
Belgium 1981 Free 6.7 
Belgium 1990 Free 4.1 
Bosnia-Herzeg. 1998 Partly Free 15.4 
Brazil 1991 Free 16.4 
Brazil 1997 Partly Free 18.1 
Britain 1981 Free 4.8 
Britain 1990 Free 5.1 
Bulgaria 1990 Partly Free 22.1 
Bulgaria 1997 Free 6.6 
Canada 1981 Free 4.8 
Canada 1990 Free 4.7 
Chile 1990 Free 5.3 
Chile 1996 Free 5.9 
China 1990 Not Free 5.2 
Colombia 1997 Partly Free 7.1 
Croatia 1995 Partly Free 4.8 
Czech Republic 1990 Free 44.9 
Denmark 1981 Free 4.2 
Denmark 1990 Free 1.6 
Dominican Rep. 1996 Partly Free 12.6 
East Germany 1990 Free 12.5 
East Germany 1997 Free 6.1 
Estonia 1996 Free 2.9 
Finland 1990 Free 2.8 
Finland 1996 Free 1.8 
France 1981 Free 8.6 
France 1990 Free 4.3 
Georgia 1996 Partly Free 9.4 
Ghana 1995 Partly Free 13.3 
Hungary 1990 Free 6.2 
Iceland 1981 Free 1.8 
Iceland 1990 Free 3.2 
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Country Year Freedom Status Proportion of people with a Revolutionary Preference
India 1990 Free 14.0 
India 1996 Partly Free 15.3 
Ireland 1981 Free 4.4 
Ireland 1990 Free 3.7 
Italy 1981 Free 7.9 
Italy 1990 Free 7.1 
Japan 1981 Free 3.1 
Japan 1990 Free 2.1 
Japan 1995 Free 3.5 
Latvia 1996 Free 10.9 
Lithuania 1996 Free 9.7 
Macedonia 1997 Partly Free 12.4 
Mexico 1981 Partly Free 12.0 
Mexico 1990 Partly Free 16.5 
Mexico 1996 Partly Free 12.8 
Moldova 1996 Partly Free 10.2 
Netherlands 1981 Free 3.4 
Netherlands 1990 Free 1.9 
Nigeria 1990 Partly Free 28.1 
Nigeria 1995 Not Free 31.6 
Norway 1982 Free 2.0 
Norway 1990 Free 2.4 
Norway 1996 Free 2.7 
Pakistan 1997 Partly Free 29.1 
Peru 1996 Partly Free 8.2 
Philippines 1996 Free 22.5 
Poland 1989 Partly Free 22.9 
Poland 1997 Free 8.9 
Portugal 1990 Free 4.7 
Russia 1991 Partly Free 17.2 
Russia 1995 Partly Free 10.9 
Serbia 1996 Not Free 12.8 
Slovakia 1990 Free 37.3 
Slovenia 1992 Free 14.3 
Slovenia 1995 Free 7.1 
South Africa 1982 Not Free 16.0 
South Africa 1990 Partly Free 15.9 
South Africa 1996 Free 12.1 
South Korea 1982 Partly Free 22.3 
South Korea 1990 Free 7.3 
South Korea 1996 Free 12.5 
Spain 1981 Free 7.9 
Spain 1990 Free 4.5 
Spain 1995 Free 4.6 
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Country Year Freedom Status Proportion of people with a Revolutionary Preference
Sweden 1982 Free 4.3 
Sweden 1990 Free 6.1 
Sweden 1996 Free 4.4 
Switzerland 1996 Free 6.6 
Taiwan 1995 Partly Free 2.9 
Turkey 1990 Partly Free 13.8 
Turkey 1996 Partly Free 21.2 
Ukraine 1996 Partly Free 8.7 
Uruguay 1996 Free 8.0 
USA 1982 Free 5.0 
USA 1990 Free 6.5 
USA 1995 Free 4.8 
Venezuela 1996 Free 11.4 
West Germany 1981 Free 2.5 
West Germany 1990 Free 1.7 
West Germany 1997 Free 2.3 
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